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Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5 (2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
 
Summary 
  
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for the sale (two counts) and giving away (one 
count) of a controlled substance issued by the district court.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Reversed and remanded.  Because the district court failed to conduct a sufficient Farreta 
canvass,2 and because the overall record did not evince a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of defendant’s right to counsel, this case must be remanded to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellant Hooks was charged with three counts of sale of a controlled substance on 
November 13, 2003.  The State subsequently reduced one count of sale to one count of giving 
away a controlled substance.  A public defender was appointed to Hooks at his justice court 
arraignment.  However, at his preliminary hearing appellant requested to proceed without 
counsel.  Hooks asked for, and received, a Farreta canvas by the justice court judge.  At the 
conclusion, the appellant was allowed to proceed pro se.  Still, the court appointed standby 
counsel.   
 Later, in district court, Hooks reiterated his desire to proceed pro se.  The judge,3 warned 
appellant of the risks inherent in representing oneself and asked questions aimed at determining 
Hooks’s education and awareness of the severity of the charges he faced.  The judge then 
appointed appellant’s standby counsel to continue in that capacity.  Standby counsel later moved 
to withdraw, whereupon Hooks reiterated his desire to proceed pro se.  In response, the judge 
scheduled a Farreta canvass for April 12, 2004.   
 On April 12, 2004, the court appointed new standby counsel.  Rather than go forward 
with the Farreta canvass, the court granted appellant’s newly appointed standby counsel a 
continuance.  Consequently, the district court failed to ever conduct a Farreta canvass; not at any 
subsequent hearing or at trial.  A jury convicted Hooks on all counts.  Further, the district court 
deemed appellant a habitual criminal and sentenced him to three concurrent prison terms of life 
with the possibility of parole after ten years.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 By M. Charles Seaton 
2 Farreta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
3 Stewart L. Bell, Eighth Judicial District Court Judge. 
Discussion 
  
 In this appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether the appellants constitutional 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated.  The Court held that the district 
court’s failure to conduct a Farreta canvass – combined with the record’s failure to indicate a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of appellant’s right to counsel – required reversal of 
his judgment of conviction.  
 The Court examined the scope of the Farreta canvass and the requirements for a valid 
waiver of the right to counsel, acknowledging that a defendant cannot “knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily” waive the right to counsel unless he is fully apprised of the severe consequences 
he may face by proceeding in the absence of counsel.4  Further, the Court noted that whether a 
waiver is valid will depend upon the circumstances of the case.5  Also, the Court referenced its 
own pronouncement on the issue, codified at SCR 253 in 1997, which directs courts to “make a 
specific, penetrating and comprehensive inquiry” of the defendant to insure that he fully 
comprehends the risks of his decision to forego counsel.6 
 The Court noted that although prior precedent disavowed any absolute requirement for a 
“mechanical” Farreta canvass in every case, it also had counseled district courts to conduct a 
searching inquiry whenever a defendant sought to proceed pro se.7  The Court then took the 
opportunity in this case to reemphasize the importance of such an inquiry, in part by noting one 
favorable consequence; avoiding a new trial on the merits. 
 In this case, the Court concluded that the record – viewed as a whole – did not 
demonstrate a valid waiver of appellant’s right to counsel.  It found the justice court’s canvass 
insufficient, on its own, to constitute a valid waiver of the right.  Further, the Court noted that the 
district court repeatedly failed, contrary to its earlier stated intention, to ever conduct an adequate 
Farreta canvass.   
 The Court followed with an analysis of the district court proceeding, holding that Judge 
Bell’s limited inquiries into appellant’s awareness of the difficulties and dangers awaiting him if 
he continued pro se were insufficient to show a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.  The 
Court seemed particularly concerned about Hooks’s apparent ignorance of his potential to face a 
finding of habitual criminal status, and the severe consequences this would (and did) have on his 
eventual sentence.   
 Finally, the Court noted the inapplicability of harmless-error analysis to waivers of the 
right to counsel, and reversed and remanded Hooks’s judgment of conviction. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 In reversing the appellant’s judgment of conviction, The Supreme Court of Nevada 
reemphasized district courts’ duty to conduct a Farreta canvass and conduct a thorough inquiry 
into whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.  
Here, the court found the record, as a whole, insufficient to demonstrate that Hooks waived his 
right to counsel.  Moreover, the Court cautioned that a justice court Farreta canvass will rarely 
                                                 
4 422 U.S. at 835. 
5 Wayne v. State, 100 Nev. 584 (1984). 
6 SCR 253(1-2). 
7 Supra at note 5.   
be sufficient, in isolation, to constitute a valid waiver of the right, especially given the substantial 
differences and dangers that await a defendant in district court.     
  
